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This paper investigates the correlation between individualism and housing bubbles. 
Individualistic culture could affect human behavior by cultivating overconfidence. People in 
individualistic environments are more confident about themselves and more likely to attribute 
their success to their own effort than those in collectivist areas. I measure individualism by 
extending a collectivism index proposed by Vandello and Cohen (1999). Housing bubble/bust 
is measured as the absolute value of the proportion of housing price unexplained by housing 
market fundamentals. Based on a panel data of 6,730 observations in 355 U.S. MSAs during 
1990-2015, I find that individualism is positively associated with the housing bubble/bust 
proxy (HBP), indicating that housing markets are less efficient and investors are more 
irrational in more individualistic areas. To mitigate the concern of endogeneity and omitted 
variables, I construct an instrumental variable (IV) using the total number of local 
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Housing bubbles have been a popular topic in real estate studies in recent years especially 
since the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008. The term “bubble” indicates that housing 
markets are not efficient and investors are not rational (Case and Shiller, 1988; Case and 
Shiller, 1990; Lai and Order, 2010; Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Ambrose, Eichholtz and 
Lindenthal, 2013; Anenberg, 2016; Glaeser and Nathanson, 2015; Ling, Ooi and Le, 2015; 
Soo, 2015). However, the majority of studies in this field focus on the relationship between 
fundamentals and housing prices (Gelain and Lansing, 2013; Goswami, Tan and Waisman, 
2014; Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai, 2005; Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz, 2008; Glaeser and 
Gyourko, 2006; Mikhed and Zemcík, 2007). 
They investigate how fundamentals change during boom and recession periods and rely on 
the failure of fundamentals in explaining housing prices to identify housing bubbles. There is 
little literature investigating investors’ sentiment and pointing to the origins of irrational 
behaviour. Understanding determinants of bubbles in a behavioural finance context is still 
important. 
According to culture studies, individualistic culture affects human behavior by cultivating 
overconfidence. People in individualistic environments are more confident in themselves and 
more likely to attribute their success to their own effort than those in collectivist areas. The 
influence of individualism fostered overconfidence has already been confirmed by previous 
studies in contributing to momentum effects in stock markets (Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010; 
Hillert et al., 2014). However, evidence in housing markets has not been found. 
In this paper, I test how individualism driven overconfidence affects housing 
bubbles/busts (unexplained proportions of housing prices). First, I regress housing prices on 
fundamentals to obtain residuals (the unexplained part). I divide the residual by the local 
housing price and define the absolute value of this fraction as housing bubble/bust proxy 
(HBP). As for the individualism-collectivism measure, I follow the methodology of Vandello 
and Cohen (1999) to create a collectivism index. I take the sum of the eight standardized 
components and linearly transform it into a collectivism score. Second, I regress the 
unexplained proportions of housing prices on collectivism scores and control variables as my 
main analysis. I find that collectivism scores are negatively correlated with the housing 
bubble/bust proxy. Analysis of fixed effects show that the effect is mainly cross-cities, and 
marginally time-varying.  
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In order to avoid a potential omitted variable problem, I use the total number of 
congregations as an instrumental variable to conduct two-stage analysis. The number of local 
congregations is a valid instrumental variable because it is associated with local 
individualism-collectivism culture but it is not directly linked to local housing prices. I 
regress collectivism scores on the IV (total number of congregation) to obtain predicted 
collectivism scores to replace real collectivism scores in score regressions. My findings are 
robust in both OLS and 2SLS panels and 2SLS results are more significant than OLS results.  
To confirm the consistency of my findings in large MSAs and to show the effect of 
individualism during different market conditions, I use four different samples of my main 
analysis: the whole sample, the big MSAs sample, the 2000-2010 period sample and the 
business cycle sample. Sample results for these last two show that the recent business cycle 
reduces the effect of individualistic culture on housing market, particularly during expansion 
and boom periods. 
To test the robustness, I conduct alternative tests using 1) an alternative big MSAs sample 
2) two different methods for business cycle periods and 3) cluster standard deviation results. 
The results are robust for my findings.  
In sum, this is the first paper investigating the effect of individualism driven 
overconfidence on housing bubbles/busts to my knowledge. This paper contributes to the 
sociological and psychological literature of culture dimensions. The findings of this paper 
imply that individualistic culture affects housing market investors’ decision making, which is 
an evidence of behavioral finance theories. More importantly, this paper identifies 
individualistic culture as a contributor of housing bubbles/busts, extending housing bubble 
research. As discussed above, many housing bubble studies focus on the relationship between 
housing prices and fundamentals, but very little research directly investigates the effect of 
investors’ sentiment on housing market ups and downs. The research that does exist is mainly 
based on surveys or news and does not point out the true origins and factors of sentiment. 
Particularly, there is no research applying the individualism driven overconfidence to the 
housing market nor relating the individualism-collectivism dimension with housing bubbles. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 includes literature review and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 provides the data source and variable construction. 
Section 4 illustrates my main methodology. Summary statistics and empirical results are 
explained in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes robustness tests and Section 7 concludes with 




2. Literature review & Hypotheses development 
 
2.1 Housing bubbles  
Although the power of fundamental variables in explaining housing prices has already 
been justified, a large number of housing market studies show that the housing market is 
inefficient.  
Case and Shiller (1988) investigate the single family market in four Metropolitan areas in 
the U.S. and find a momentum effect in real housing prices. They confirm that the market is 
inefficient in later work (Case and Shiller, 1990). Momentum in U.S. housing price 
appreciation during 1980-2005 period is also identified by Lai and Order (2010). Abraham 
and Hendershott (1996) construct a fundamental equilibrium model for data of over 30 U.S. 
cities in 15 years and find that the equilibrium price can explain only two-fifths of the real 
price appreciation. The mispricing of housing prices can also be long lasting (Ambrose, 
Eichholtz and Lindenthal, 2013). Anenberg (2016) studies this further and shows the 
mechanism by which imperfect housing market information affects individual sellers’ 
behaviour and market dynamics.  
According to housing market inefficiency research, a housing bubble is identified when 
fundamental factors fail to explain housing prices (Stiglitz, 1990; Case and Shiller, 2003; 
Mikhed and Zemcík, 2009; Abraham and Hendershott, 1996). Namely, a housing bubble is 
the unexplained part of housing prices. There are mainly three ways to compare housing 
prices to fundamentals.  
The first way is to employ a rent-price ratio as an indicator of a bubble. For example, 
Ambrose, Eichholtz and Lindenthal (2013) investigate the rent-price ratio in Amsterdam from 
1650 to 2005 to show that it can take decades for the market to adjust back to benchmark. At 
the same time, Gelain and Lansing (2013) find that high volatility in the price-rent ratio from 
1960 to 2013 in the U.S. cannot be explained by their asset pricing model. A cross-sectional 
analysis of 22 U.S. regions exhibits persistent unexplained high price-rent ratios after 2002 
(Goswami, Tan and Waisman, 2014). However, Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) 
suggest that price-rent ratios at the metropolitan areas level is not an appropriate measure of a 
local bubble because it ignores the effect of local variables such as housing supply elasticity.  
The second approach is to look at the supply side and to use housing construction costs as 
a benchmark. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) suggest that there are less frequent and 
shorter housing bubbles in more elastic housing supply areas. Although in some of these 
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areas, large housing booms happened in 2003-2008 period, the market adjusted to 
construction costs quickly. The power of construction costs is also confirmed by Gyourko 
and Saiz (2004) and Mayer and Somerville (2000). 
Last but not least, a more intuitive way to see housing bubbles is to apply a local economic 
model including variables such as population, income and employment, since a housing 
bubble is a local phenomenon (Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai, 2005). This notion originates 
from the urban real estate model proposed by Alonso (1964). The author shows that the 
equilibrium housing price is determined by local wages and amenities. Following this urban 
approach, Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) create a model of housing prices including local 
variables: population, income, interest rates and supply elasticity and they confirm that 
housing markets are largely local, not national.  
Many studies do find empirical evidence of local housing bubbles. Abraham and 
Hendershott (1996) find that income growth, construction costs, and after tax interest rates 
cannot support the real housing price appreciation during 1979-1995. They identify housing 
bubbles/busts as the deviations between real housing prices and their model fundamental 
prices. Furthermore, Lai and Order (2010) generate an error term as housing bubbles from a 
local fundamental model and study the errors for different metropolitan areas to understand 
the price momentum after 1999. They further divide MSAs into bubble and non-bubble 
groups and show different performance of market variables between groups. Additionally, by 
examining MSA panel data, Mikhed and Zemcík (2007) develop a bubble indicator based on 
overlapping 10-year intervals, price-rent ratios, and panel tests for rents and prices.  
 
2.2 Individualism-collectivism culture dimension  
Individualism-collectivism is probably the most important dimension of culture in 
sociology literature (Vandello and Cohen, 1999; Triandis et al., 1988; Triandis, 2001; Mezei, 
1974; Mead, 2002). 
According to Hofstede (1980), and Markus and Kitayama (1991), individualism is a social 
framework where people regard themselves more as independent individuals and only care 
about themselves and their close families. In contrast, collectivism is a community culture 
where people see themselves as part of a community and feel less differentiated from others. 
This culture dimension is reflected on local people’s attitudes and behavior (Triandis et al., 
1988). People in individualistic cultures center on themselves and tend to be independent 
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from the others, while collectivist cultures focus on the group and emphasize on the 
relationship within communities (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995).  
Therefore, individualism (usually in North American countries) fosters overconfidence 
and collectivism (mostly in Asian countries) cultivates modesty (Bond, Leung and Wan, 
1982; Triandis, 2001). Markus and Kitayama (1991) point out that individualists tend to be 
overconfident and self-attributed. One of their main findings is that American people are 
more confident of their own abilities, thinking them to be above the average, but people from 
more collectivist countries do not. This is also consistent with implications of Heine et al 
(1999)’s children research and findings of many others (Bellah et al., 1985; Greenfield and 
Suzuki, 1998; Markus et al, 1997).  
 
2.3 Overconfidence, inefficient markets and housing bubbles 
Overconfidence bias can explain inefficient markets according to previous studies. Odean 
(1998) develops a traders’ overconfidence model based on information distribution. He finds 
that overconfidence increases trading volume and market depth but harms the utility of 
overconfident traders. In addition, stock return momentum and excess volatility are found to 
be consequences of this overconfidence (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998).  
More specifically, individualism fostered overconfidence has already been tested and 
confirmed as a determinant for abnormal returns in stock markets. Chui, Titman, and Wei 
(2010) use the individualism index developed by Hofstede (2001) as a measure of local 
culture and find that trading volume, volatility and the magnitude of momentum profits 
increase with the level of individualism. Similarly, Hillert, Jacobs and Müller (2014) prove 
that individualism driven overconfidence can explain significant momentum profits and long-
term reversals. Specifically, they employ collectivism scores for U.S. states from Vandello 
and Cohen (1999) to sort the stock portfolios and they find that the momentum effects as well 
as the long-term reversals in individualistic areas are more pronounced than in collectivist 
areas. 
On the other hand, housing market participants are overconfident and investors’ 
expectations play a role in contributing to housing bubbles/busts. Home buyers are found to 
be overconfident about themselves so that they fail to forecast housing busts (Glaeser and 
Nathanson, 2015). Relying on a survey, Ling, Ooi and Le (2015) demonstrate that home 
buyers, builders and lenders’ sentiment affects housing price appreciation and the effect is 
felt beyond fundamentals. By analysing local news tones, Soo (2015) shows that investors’ 
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sentiment has predictive power for future housing prices. In addition, Stiglitz (1990) 
concludes that housing bubbles come from investors’ expectations, not fundamentals. A 
similar definition is also used by Case and Shiller (2003). In their paper, a housing bubble 
refers to “a situation in which excessive public expectations of future price increases cause 
prices to be temporarily elevated”. 
 
2.4 Hypotheses development 
Since local individualism culture traits affect investors’ behavior and investors’ sentiment 
influences housing prices, there should be a relationship between individualistic culture and 
housing bubbles. Thus, when the local culture is more collectivist, people are less likely to 
have overconfidence bias and there are less housing bubbles and busts. In this paper, I 
construct a collectivism score index following Vandello and Cohen (1999) to measure local 
individualism-collectivism culture. The higher the score, the more collectivist the local 
culture. I use the proportion of the unexplained part of local housing prices as a housing 
bubble/bust proxy. Thereby, a hypothesis can be formulated as below. 
Hypothesis 1: Collectivism scores and the housing bubble/bust proxy are significantly 
negatively correlated. 
Meanwhile, according to the urban literature, a housing bubble/bust is a local 
phenomenon. The effect of individualism driven overconfidence on housing bubbles/busts 
should also be mostly local. This leads to the second hypothesis below. 
Hypothesis 2: The relation between collectivism scores and the housing bubble/bust proxy 
is mainly cross-sectional. 
 
3. Data  
 
In this paper, I construct panel data from 1990 to 2015 for 355 Metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSA) in the U.S. to conduct my analysis. A MSA is a highly populated and urbanized 
geographical concept introduced and commonly used by U.S. Census Bureau. Table 1 
summarizes definitions of all the variables. 
 




3.1 Housing prices measure 
The measure for housing prices (hp) is the all-transactions FHFA Housing Price Index 
(HPI) for MSA’s in the U.S. I convert the quarterly data into annual data by taking means of 
the four quarters in the same year. The data is available from the website of the American 
Federal Housing Finance Agency. This index is estimated using both sales prices and 
appraisal data. The sample includes data from 1990 to 2015. 
 
3.2 Fundamentals 
I follow the selection of fundamental variables of Case and Shiller (2003) but I use 
housing permits instead of housing starts because MSA housing starts data during 1990-2015 
is not complete. My fundamental variables are summarized as follow: 
 income is measured by personal income per capita (thousands) and the yearly data 
by MSA from 1990 to 2015 is from Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
 population data (thousands) is from U.S. Census Bureau Population and Housing 
Unit Estimates. From 1990 to 2000, population estimates data is not available at 
the MSA level. Instead, I merge Population County Intercensal datasets with 
County and MSA County Crosswalk data by FIPS (County code) and CBSA code 
(MSA code) to construct annual MSA population for 1990-2000 period and 
combine it with the data from 2001 to 2015; 
 employment data by MSA from 1990 to 2015 is measured by Total Full-Time and 
Part-Time Employment (thousands) and is also available at Bureau of Economic 
Analysis website.  
 unemployment rate (%) by MSA/year from 1990 to 2015 is from Civilian labor 
force and unemployment by metropolitan area (Seasonally Adjusted) dataset from 
the Local Area Unemployment Statistics on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website.  
 mortgage rate (%) is annual average mortgage interest rates on thirty-year fixed 
rate mortgages. Mortgage interest rate is the same for all the states in U.S. in the 
same year. The data is from Freddie Mac. 
 permits is the number of units (thousands) of new privately-owned residential 
construction in each year. The data is from U.S. Census Building Permits Survey. 
Because data at the MSA level is not available before 1995, I use the county level 
data from 1990 to 2015 and County to MSA crosswalk dataset to construct MSA 




3.3 Collectivism index 
I follow Vandello and Cohen (1999) and extend their collectivism index to measure local 
individualism-collectivism culture. There are eight items to construct the index. Most data for 
the items is from U.S. Census surveys. Annual data for each MSA from 2005 to 2015 for 
percentage of people living alone (reversed scores), percentage of elderly people living alone 
(reversed scores), percentage of households with grandchildren in them, divorce to marriage 
ratio (reversed scores), ratio of people carpooling to work to people driving alone, 
percentage of self-employed workers (reversed scores) is available from the U.S. Census 
American Community Survey (ACS). Data in 1990 and 2000 can also be found in U.S. 
census decennial surveys. Since U.S. census decennial survey data in 1990 is only available 
in PDF format, I manually collect the six index variables data for each MSA from census 
comprehensive summary tables. Because census reports in 1990, 2000 and later years do not 
use the same code system for MSAs and names of MSAs are not exactly the same, I can only 
determine and merge the data by MSA names and states by hand. 
For the other two items: percentage of people with no religious affiliation (reversed 
scores) is only available in the years 1990 (by county), 2000 (by county) and 2010 (by MSA) 
from the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) Religious 
Congregations and Membership Study. As above, I construct MSA data for 1990 and 2000 by 
combing the county data with the crosswalk dataset. I hand collect the county level data for 
average percentage voting Libertarian over the last four presidential elections (reversed 
scores), from the website of Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. I collect 1976 
to 2012 presidential elections data and merge into MSA level and then calculate the average 
over the last four elections for each MSA/year during 1990 - 2015. The website sometimes 
reports neither the votes nor the percentage of the votes for Libertarian candidates in each 
county because they have too few votes. In that case, I use the percentage of votes out of 
Democratic and Republican candidates as a proxy.  
Because the data for years between 1990 and 2000 and between 2000 and 2005 is missing 
for the former six variables, I interpolate the missing values by assuming the annual growth 
rate stays the same in the same period of time. Likewise, I also interpolate the data using the 
three years decennial data to get annual no religious affiliated percent data. 
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To generate the individualism-collectivism measure score, I standardize each of the eight 
items and take the sum of them for each MSA/year. To make the index readable and to avoid 
negative scores, I further multiply the sum with 5 and then plus 120.  
 
3.4 Instrumental variable  
My instrumental variable for collectivism scores in the 2SLS analysis in this paper is 
congregation, which is the number of congregations by MSA/year. The total number of 
congregations are not determined by the local housing price while it is correlated with culture 
traits like individualism. congregation data is also from ASARB Religious Congregations 
and Membership Study datasets. As with the no religious affiliation data, I merge county data 
into MSA data and interpolate missing years’ data during 1990 to 2015. 
 
Because of different data sources for all the variables, my final dataset is unbalanced and it 




To investigate the relationship between local collectivism scores and housing bubbles, I 
conduct a two-step analysis: 1) regress the local housing price on fundamentals to obtain the 
proportion of the unexplained part of the housing price; 2) regress it on collectivism scores 
and control variables. The proportion of the unexplained part of the housing price measures 
the magnitude of the local housing bubble/bust. 
ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + β𝑘 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (𝑘 = 1, 2, 3 … 6)        (1) 
Equation (1) describes the first step analysis. hp is the housing price index, fundamentals 
are the six variables explained in the data section. 𝜖 is the error term in this model. 
 I then take residuals of this fundamental regression and divide them by housing prices. I 
also multiply the absolute value of the proportion by 100 to make it more readable. This 
figure represents the percent of housing prices that cannot be explained by the fundamentals 
in each MSA/year. Thus, I define it as HBP (housing bubble/bust proxy):  
𝐻𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠 ( 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑡
 ) ∗ 100   (2) 
To see the relationship between collectivism-individualism dimension and HBP, I regress 
HBP from equation (2) on score which is the collectivism-individualism measure. I also use 
the variables 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘  in equation (1) as controls in this step. I also include fixed 
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effects in my analysis. φ𝑖 is either MSA fixed effects or Region fixed effects depending on 
specifications and ω𝑡 is year fixed effects.  𝜏𝑖𝑡 is the error term of this model. 
𝐻𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛾1𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑘 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + φ𝑖 + ω𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡  (𝑘 = 1, 2, 3 … 6)   (3) 
However, there is an omitted variable concern at this step. Some variables that are not 
included in equation (3) could be related to HBP. Therefore the inferences could be 
misleading in understanding the relationship between 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 and HBP. To solve this potential 
problem, I use congregation as an instrumental variable for score. The distribution of 
congregations in U.S. reflects the local culture traits including individualism dimension but it 
should have no direct relation with local housing prices. I design a two-stage analysis in 
equation (4) and (5) by 1) instrumenting score with congregation for each MSA and 2) 
replacing predicted score with actual score in equation (3).  
So the first stage is: 
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛿𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑘  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + ε𝑖𝑡  (𝑘 = 1, 2, 3 … 6)  (4) 
And the second stage is: 
𝐻𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛾1𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟?̂?𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑘 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + φ𝑖 + ω𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡  (𝑘 = 1, 2, 3 … 6)   (5) 




5.1 Summary statistics 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of my final dataset, panel A gives a general picture 
of the panel. I identify 185 MSAs in 1990 and over 90% of them (173) have data in all the 
years during the 26 years period. Moreover, 224 out of 355 MSAs have balanced data during 
the 2000-2015 period. 
Table 2 Panel C and Figure 1 shows that the U.S. housing market experienced a boom 
from 2004 to 2006 and then a bust from 2007 to 2010 because of the global financial crisis 
(GFC) in 2008. Since 2011, the market started to recover from the 2008 crisis and the 
housing price increased significantly. Therefore, I identify four periods during this recent 
business cycle: 2000-2003 is an expansion period; 2004-2006 is a boom period; 2007-2010 is 
a bust period; and 2011-2015 is a recovery period. This is generally consistent with the 
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[Insert Figure 1 & Figure 2 here] 
 
Also, as Panel B of Table 2 shows, fundamentals, especially permits, population and 
employment, are highly correlated with each other and they are moving together with hp 
during this business cycle. Meanwhile, the number of congregations increases steadily, 
especially after 2000 (Table 2 Panel C).  
To show the geographic pattern of individualism-collectivism clearly, I create a map of 
collectivism scores by taking means of all years data for each state in Figure 3 Panel A. For 
those MSAs located at the boundaries of more than one state, I include them in each state 
they belong to. Data of six states (VT, NH, ME, MA, RI and CT) in the North East Region is 
missing. To compare with previous studies of American individualism pattern, I also include 
the collectivism score map created by Vandello and Cohen (1999) in Figure 3 Panel B.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
The geographic patterns of individualism-collectivism generally remain similar with that 
shown by Vandello and Cohen (1999). As Panel A shows, the most collectivist areas are deep 
south states, namely South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Tennessee, 
Arkansas, and North Carolina. Utah and California are also very collectivist. Meanwhile, the 
most individualistic states concentrate on Mountain West and Great Plains (Montana, 
Wyoming, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, Nebraska, Colorado, and Kansas). In the northeast 
area, despite other missing states, New York also exhibits strong individualism. The most 
significant difference between this map and Vandello and Cohen (1999)’s map is Florida. It 
was relatively collectivist but becomes one of the most individualistic states in Figure 3.  
Previous studies find that Northeast and West areas (Abraham and Hendershott, 1996) and 
coastal cities (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2006) have larger housing price fluctuations than other 
areas in U.S. Figure 3 shows that these areas are also more individualistic than the others. 
Furthermore, according to the literature, the high volatility of these local housing prices can 
                                                          
1
 The NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) identified December 2007 as the most recent peak and 




hardly be explained by fundamental models. As Figure 1 shows, the top 20 individualistic 
cities’ average housing price is more volatile than the average housing price of all MSAs, 
mainly during the recent boom-bust period. After 2011, the former increases noticeably more 
quickly than the latter.  
Because of this clear evidence, I suspect that individualistic culture affects the unexplained 
part of housing prices. In addition, I expect that the effect of individualism on the housing 
market is more cross-sectional, rather than time-varying, relative to the housing price 
fluctuation. Apparently, the consistency between Figure 3 Panel A and Panel B indicates that 
the individualism-collectivism culture trait across U.S. is roughly unchanged across time. 
Also, much smaller within (9.46) than between (19.37) standard deviation of collectivism 
scores in Table 2 Panel D suggests a very stable culture pattern over time. Therefore, the 
major variation of score is among cities rather than across years. Meanwhile the variation of 
housing prices comes from both dimensions: cross-sectional and time-varying standard 
deviations are not notably different (29.04 versus 34.66).  
 
5.2 Fundamental regressions  
To further investigate the relationship between collectivism-individualism culture and 
housing prices, I first regress the housing price on fundamental variables to obtain the 
unexplained part of the housing price. I present results for four different samples in Table 3: 
(1) the whole sample, (2) a sample with big MSAs (population above the median); (3) a 
sample during the period that the average individualistic areas’ housing price deviates the 
most from the average for all MSAs and (4) a sample with the data in the recent business 
cycle. The results are shown in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Based on statistical significance, all of the six fundamental variables have strong 
explanatory power for hp in all four regressions. income and population represent the demand 
side while permits proxies for the supply side in the housing market. All of the three 
fundamentals have positive coefficients. This suggests that more populated and more 
developed areas have higher housing prices. mortgage rate provides credit supply for housing 
buyers. The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that the looser credit policy leads to 
easier financing for housing market investors. unemployment rate has a negative sign because 
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the higher the unemployment ratio, the more people lose stable income sources and cannot 
afford to buy properties. employment negatively correlates with housing prices. This finding 
is consistent with Case and Shiller (2003). Their explanation is that the coefficients of 
employment may be affected by simultaneity in reduced form equations. employment 
influences the local housing price; meanwhile, increasing housing prices means higher costs 
of the housing arrangement for employees so that they give up local job markets and move to 
other cities (Case, 1986). It may also be that employment measures the local labor force but 
ignores immigrants. Many new immigrants are not part of local labor force but they 
significantly contribute to local housing price rises. Therefore, cities with a larger proportion 
of immigrants but less labor force have higher housing prices. 
The fundamentals in total explain about 60% of housing prices in my whole sample results 
and in big MSA sample results. The explanatory power becomes much weaker during 2000-
2015, covering only around 30% of housing prices. This is consistent with the data summary 
above that during the recent business cycle, the housing price is more volatile and 
fundamentals are not as useful as in understanding the housing market.  
 
Then I plot HBP calculated from Table 3 Model 1. Figure 4 shows that in general, both the 
collectivist and the individualistic areas experienced similar housing bubble/bust fluctuations; 
however, individualistic areas always dominate collectivist areas in terms of the unexplained 
proportion of local housing prices. This is an evidence that the investors’ investment 
decisions are affected by the local culture traits and the influence is long lasting and stable. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
When the housing market boomed and busted from 2004 to 2010, housing prices exhibited 
the most deviation from fundamentals. During the expansion period (2000-2003), 
fundamentals can explain on average 80%- 85% of local housing prices in individualistic 
areas each year and on average 85%-90% in collectivist areas each year. Since 2004, housing 
bubbles increase significantly up to more than 35% of local housing prices in individualistic 
areas and 25%- 30% in collectivist areas in 2006. After that, when the housing market started 
to go down in 2007, the average unexplained part of housing prices in both areas began to 
drop from 28% of local housing prices dramatically to below 15% and 10% in 2010 
respectively. Nevertheless, individualistic cities exhibited noticeably more bubbles/busts (on 
average 5 to 10 percent of local housing prices) than collectivist cities since 2011. 
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Another finding from Figure 4 is that individualistic areas and collectivist areas have the 
least difference during the recent business cycle from 2000 to 2010. This indicates that 
behavior of housing market investors was less affected by individualism but more determined 
by the 2008 crisis.  
 
5.3 Score regressions  
In the second step, I regress HBP on score and add fundamental variables as controls 
using both OLS and 2SLS methods with congregation as an instrumental variable. I use both 
methods for the same four samples as Table 3 separately: the whole sample, the big MSAs 
sample, the 2000-2010 sample and the recent business cycle sample (using dummies for each 
of the four periods). In addition, to control time and local variables, for both regressions, I 
include three types of fixed effects: year fixed effects, MSA fixed effects and Region fixed 
effects. Region is determined by which region in the U.S. the MSA belongs to (Northeast, 
Midwest, South or West). If the MSA is on the boundaries of two or more regions, it depends 
on which region has more population in that MSA.  
congregation is a valid instrumental variable for score in all samples in the first stages of 
2SLS regressions because it passes the weak IV tests (F test of excluded instrument and 
Sanderson-Windmeijer F test) for all samples. The IV method requires an exclusion 
restriction which cannot be directly tested. The exclusion restriction asserts that congregation 
matters for housing bubbles only insofar as it changes collectivism scores. I argue that 
congregation affects the local individualism-collectivism culture which ultimately affects 
housing market behavior.  
 
5.3.1 Baseline regressions 
My baseline regression results in Table 4 suggest that collectivism scores are significantly 
negatively associated with the housing bubble/bust proxy, even after controlling 
fundamentals and instrumenting with the number of local congregations.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
In Table 4 Panel A, score is significant at the 0.01 level in all regressions except Model 4 
with both MSA and year fixed effects (significant at 0.1 level). Moreover, score coefficients 
in Region fixed effects models (Model 5 and Model 6) have smaller absolute values than in 
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year fixed effects models (Model 2 and Model 4). This is consistent with my data summaries 
that most of the variation of score is from between MSAs but not from within MSAs. 
While instrumented score exhibits more significant effects. In all models in Table 4 Panel 
B, score coefficients are significant at 0.01 level. 2SLS results suggest that 1 unit of score 
decrease is associated with at least 0.6 and at most 1.06 units of HBP increase. Moreover, 
score coefficient in Panel B Model 1 is more than 15 times of that in Panel A Model 1. More 
negative score coefficients in 2SLS models than in OLS models suggest that omitted 
variables cause a positive bias in estimated coefficients. Besides, when adding fixed effects, 
the size of score coefficient increases in most cases. 
 
5.3.2 Regressions of big MSAs sample 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 shows the results for the Big MSAs sample. Big MSAs are defined as MSAs with 
population above the median population (243,124.5) in the whole dataset. In general, the big 
MSAs sample results have a similar pattern as the whole sample. The effect of score on HBP 
is negative and significant. 1 unit of score decrease is associated with at most 0.65 (2SLS) 
unit of HBP increase. When adding MSA/Region fixed effects, not only size but also 
significance level decreases. The OLS table even has positive sign score coefficients in MSA 
fixed effects regressions, but these are barely significant. This also proves that the effect of 
the local individualism trait is more cross-sectional and less time-varying. 
However, individualism has a weaker effect on housing bubbles/busts in big cities. The 
size and significance level of score coefficients in all regressions are distinctly smaller than 
those in Table 4.  
 
5.3.3 Regressions of 2000-2010 sample 
Figure 1 shows that during 2000-2010, the average housing price of individualistic areas 
deviates the most from that of all cities. To investigate the effect of score during this period, I 
replicate my analysis with a sample including only data from 2000 to 2010. Table 6 presents 
the results for this sample.  
 




Different from results of Table 4 and Table 5, score coefficients in Table 6 have mainly 
reversed results in OLS regressions. In Panel A, OLS MSA fixed effects regressions (Model 
3 and Model 4) have the only significant but positive score coefficients. In other models in 
OLS results, score coefficients are negative but not significant at all. While when I use 
instrumented score in Table 6 Panel B, the results become consistent with my previous 
findings that score negatively and significantly affects HBP. The explanatory power of score 
is still missing when adding MSA fixed effects. This large difference between OLS and 2SLS 
results suggests that during 2000 - 2010, the 2008 crisis and corresponding business cycle 
significantly affect U.S. housing market performance. As descriptive statistics show, there 
was an obvious housing market boom and a bust from 2000 to 2010. 2SLS method 
successfully controls omitted variables affected by the recent business cycle. Therefore the 
2SLS results are similar with previous regression findings. In addition, the individualism 
effect is not weak: 1 unit of score decrease is related to up to 0.82 unit of HBP increase.  
 
5.3.4 Regressions of business cycle sample 
In light of patterns showing in the 2000 to 2010 sample, I wonder whether and how the 
recent business cycle after 2000 influences the relationship between the housing market and 
local culture. Based on my discussion of average housing price statistics and according to the 
NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research), there are 4 periods during the business 
cycle: 2000-2003 is an expansion period; 2004-2006 is a boom period; 2007-2010 is a bust 
period; and 2011-2015 as a recovery period. I therefore construct 4 dummy variables: d1, d2, 
d3 and d4 to represent each period. I include 4 score variables by multiply score and the four 
dummies respectively to replace the variable score in my previous regressions. I use HBP 
calculated from Table 3 Model 4 as the dependent variable in Table 7. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 Panel A shows that the effect of score is not robust, especially in 2004-2006 
housing boom period. Fixed effects reduce the significance and sway signs of score in all 
periods. Four of six regressions have positive score*d2 coefficients and three are significant 
at the same time. Only when the market started to revive in the recovery period (2011-2015), 
do the results become consistent with previous findings. For all periods, the most different 
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results come from MSA fixed effects: all the coefficients of score interaction terms are 
positive in Model 3 and Model 4.  
In Table 7 Panel B, instrumented score exhibits better results but similar patterns: most of 
the score dummy coefficients are negative, but the statistical significance is reduced by 
adding fixed effects, particularly MSA fixed effects. All the significant interaction term 
coefficients are negative and all score dummy coefficients in Model 3 and Model 4 are not 
significant. The 2000-2003 expansion period has the least robust score coefficients among all 
four periods. 
 
In score regression tables above, coefficients of control variables are very significant and 
are robust in terms of both signs and sizes in most cases, which means that fundamentals 
have strong explanatory power for HBP. income, population and permits have positive 
coefficients, which means that more developed and urbanised areas have more volatile 
housing cycles. In these areas, the population density is higher and housing markets are 
mature so that markets can reflect housing investors and owners’ sentiment quickly. 
mortgage rate has positive effects on HBP in most tables. One reason is that more credit 
supply advocates a housing boom. After controlling for MSA characteristics, higher 
unemployment rate contributes to less housing bubbles. employment is always negatively 
related with HBP. This may be due to the simultaneity relation between employment and 
HBP in reduced form equations (Case and Shiller, 2003). More employment may indicate 
high demand of housing. While local housing bubbles scare employees away (Case, 1986). 
Another explanation for negative employment coefficients is that the effect of non-labor 
immigrants is ignored in employment.  
 
6. Robustness tests 
 
6.1 Alternative big MSAs sample 
To test the robustness of big MSA regressions, I use another method to reset my big MSAs 
sample and rerun the regressions. Specifically, I determine the big MSAs for each year by 
taking medians of  population by year. For each particular year, I include MSAs with 
population over the median of that year as big MSAs. The results are shown in Table 8. The 
general pattern of the effects of score are robust in the alternative big MSA sample 
regressions. score is negatively related to HBP. Compared with baseline regression results, 
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both the size and the significance of score coefficients are somewhat smaller. 2SLS shows 
better results than OLS results in general: for every model, the size of the score effect in 
2SLS is about 20 times that in OLS; All the score coefficients are negative in the 2SLS table 
while 2 out of 3 are positive and only significant at 10 percent level in the OLS table. At the 
same time, all the control variables in Table 8 have similar sizes, signs and significance with 
Table 5 as well. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
6.2 Alternative methods for business cycle  
To test the effect in the recent business cycle since 2000, I use another two ways to 
conduct my analysis. Results of both confirm my previous findings.  
First, I run the two-step analysis (both fundamental regression and score regressions) for 
each of the four periods separately. The results of my separate samples for the business cycle 
are summarized in Table 9. The effect of individualism is less pronounced during the recent 
business cycle. score loses much significance in explaining the housing bubble/bust proxy 
especially during 2004-2006 in both OLS and 2SLS regressions. Most of the significant score 
coefficients have negative signs, especially in 2SLS regressions.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
2SLS regressions show better results than OLS regressions because potential omitted 
variables affecting housing markets are controlled by the instrumental variable. In Table 9, 
congregation is still a powerful instrumental variable for score. It passes the weak IV tests (F 
test of excluded instrument and Sanderson-Windmeijer F test) in the last three periods and is 
only close to being powerful in the first period (2000-2003)
2
.  
The second method is to use a dummy regression for each respective period of the 
business cycle sample during 2000-2015. For example, for expansion period 2000-2003, I use 
d1, score, the interaction term score*d1 and the same controls as my independent variables. 
The dependent variable is HBP from Table 3 Model 4. The results are still similar with my 
previous findings in Table 7 and Table 9. The detailed results are included in Appendix in 
Table A1. 
                                                          
2
 The F value of excluded instrument and Sanderson-Windmeijer F value is both 8.12 and the usually used 




6.3 Clustered standard deviation results 
For all score regressions I discussed above, I check clustered standard deviation by year 
and by MSA respectively. The significance level of score coefficients is robust in either 
clustered results. As an example, in Appendix Table A2 and Table A3, I show baseline 




In this paper, I examine the correlation between individualism and housing bubbles/busts. 
Housing bubble/bust proxy is defined as the proportion of housing prices unexplained by 
fundamental variables. I measure individualism by extending a collectivism index proposed 
by Vandello and Cohen (1999). 
My findings support both hypotheses: 1) Individualism driven overconfidence cultivates 
housing bubbles/busts and 2) the effect is mainly cross-sectional. Collectivism scores 
negatively influence the unexplained parts of housing prices. Both OLS and 2SLS show 
significant and negative coefficients of score. 2SLS results exhibit more significance than 
OLS results. The findings are robust in the whole sample and in the big MSAs sample. 
Another finding is that the business cycle influences the effect of individualism culture. 
The score effect is only identified in 2SLS regressions during 2000-2010. During expansion 
and boom periods from 2000 to 2006, the score effect becomes weaker and is not robust in 
different test samples. Meanwhile, when markets revive from the crisis after 2010, the effect 
comes back to normal. 
Robustness tests have mainly consistent results with my main analysis. Reconstructing 
samples and using interaction terms do not affect my findings. Clustering standard deviation 
results confirm significance levels of independent variables in all score regressions.  
There are still some limitations of this study. First, my panel is unbalanced and some 
MSAs in the North East Region are missing because data are from various sources and MSAs 
are changing over time. Second, part of data for the components of score and for the 
instrumental variable are interpolated due to data unavailability, especially from 1990 to 
2005. It therefore may not reflect the real change of individualism traits and congregation 
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Figure 1. All cities and top 20 individualistic cities annual average housing prices    
This figure shows annual average housing prices for all MSAs and for the top 20 individualistic MSAs respectively 
during 1990-2015. X axis is Year and Y axis is the average housing price index. Top 20 individualistic cities are 20 




Figure 2. Annual average collectivism score 















































































































































































































































Figure 3. Collectivism score maps of U.S. States 
Panel A is a U.S. state collectivism score map based on my collectivism index. To create the map, I classify MSAs 
by the states they belong to. For MSAs cross states, I include them in each state they belong to. Then I take the mean 
of collectivism scores of all the MSAs for all years in each state and draw the map based on the average score for 
each state. There are six levels of scores. The lighter colour means lower collectivism score and the more 
individualistic the state is. However, the scores of six states: VT, NH, ME, MA, RI and CT are missing.  
Panel B is the collectivism score map shown on page 284 in “Vandello, J. A., & Cohen, D. (1999). Patterns of 
individualism and collectivism across the United States. Journal of personality and social psychology, 77(2), 279. ” 
Panel A: Collectivism score map based on my collectivism index 
 






Figure 4. Average housing bubble/bust proxy of collectivist areas and of individualistic 
areas 
This figure provides annual average housing bubble/bust proxy for collectivist areas and for individualistic areas. 
Housing bubble/bust proxy is defined as the absolute value of the fundamental regression residual divided by the 
local housing price and then multiplied by 100. X axis is Year and Y axis is the housing bubble/bust proxy (HBP) 
calculated from Model 1 in Table 3. Collectivist areas include the top 20 MSAs with highest average collectivism 
scores from 1990 to 2015. Accordingly, individualistic areas include the top 20 MSAs with lowest average 



































































































































Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variables Description Source 
Housing price measure 
hp  all-transactions FHFA Housing Price Index (HPI)  
American Federal Housing Finance Agency; converted from quarterly data by 
taking means 
Fundamentals   
income  personal income per capita (thousands)  Bureau of Economic Analysis 
population population (thousands)  
U.S. Census Bureau Population and Housing Unit Estimates; 1990-2000 period 
data is converted from county level  
employment   Total Full-Time and Part-Time Employment (thousands) Bureau of Economic Analysis  
unemployment rate  unemployment rate (%) Local Area Unemployment Statistics in Bureau of Labor Statistics 
mortgage rate 




the number of units of new privately-owned residential 
construction (thousands) 
U.S. Census Building Permits Survey; converted from county level 
Collectivism index components 
percentage of people living alone (reversed scores) 
data from 2005 to 2015 is from U.S. Census American Community Survey (ACS); 
data in 1990 and 2000 is from U.S. census decennial surveys; 
data from 1991 to 1999 is constructed by interpolation 
percentage of households with grandchildren in them 
percentage of elderly people living alone (reversed scores) 
divorce to marriage ratio (reversed scores) 
ratio of people carpooling to work to people driving alone 
percentage of self-employed workers (reversed scores)  
percentage of people with no religious affiliation (reversed scores)  
data in 1990, 2000 and 2010 is from Association of Statisticians of American 
Religious Bodies (ASARB); data in missing years is from interpolation 
average percentage voting Libertarian over the last four presidential elections 
(reversed scores) 
Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections 
Individualism- collectivism measure   
score collectivism index score the sum of standardized eight components multiplies 5 then plus 120 
Instrumental variable    
congregation the total number of local congregations  
data in 1990, 2000 and 2010 is from Association of Statisticians of American 
Religious Bodies (ASARB); data in missing years is from interpolation 
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Dependent variable for score regressions  
HBP 
the proportion the housing price unexplained by 
fundamentals 
the absolute value of the residual of fundamental regression divided by housing 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. Panel A shows the number of MSAs in each year from 1990 to 2015. Panel B provides the correlation matrix of hp, 
fundamentals variables, score and the instrumental variable (congregation). Panel C reports average values of each variable for each year. Panel D shows the 
overall, between and within statistics for hp and score, including mean, standard deviation, the total number of observations, minimum and maximum. 
Panel A: The number of MSAs for each year  
































Panel C: Average values for variables for each year 
Year hp employment  income  permits  population  unemployment mortgage score congregation 
  
(thousands  (thousands  (thousands  (thousands                     rate         rate 
  
    of labor force) of dollars) of units) of persons) 
  
    
1990 85.47 248.31 17.35 2.26 432.69 5.82 10.13 130.96 429.06 
1991 89.27 240.62 17.79 2.02 428.67 6.72 9.25 131.25 415.24 
1992 92.39 234.26 18.71 2.33 420.47 7.15 8.39 131.07 406.86 
1993 96.17 236.64 19.28 2.58 421.4 6.72 7.31 130.87 405.38 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of variables   





congregation score HBP 
hp 1.00 
        
 
income 0.73 1.00 
       
 
employment 0.12 0.23 1.00 
      
 
permits 0.08 0.07 0.78 1.00 
     
 
population 0.12 0.21 0.99 0.77 1.00 




-0.65 -0.77 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 1.00 




0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.15 -0.03 -0.25 1.00 
  
 
congregation 0.10 0.23 0.92 0.67 0.92 -0.10 -0.06 1.00 
 
 
score -0.31 -0.43 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.38 0.02 0.06 1.00  
HBP 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.11 1.00 
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1994 99.21 242.79 20.09 2.82 426.42 6.07 8.38 130.48 407.16 
1995 104.08 249.38 20.94 2.79 428.55 5.7 7.93 130.14 409.2 
1996 106.7 255.56 21.86 3.01 434.36 5.48 7.81 130.08 411.95 
1997 111.18 261.96 22.82 2.97 440.52 5.11 7.6 129.72 414.7 
1998 115.85 269.26 24.09 3.3 446.53 4.81 6.94 129.36 417.45 
1999 119.03 274.96 24.89 3.55 452.49 4.52 7.44 129 420.2 
2000 125.21 269.47 26.2 3.22 442.35 4.2 8.05 128.13 407.63 
2001 132.76 277.07 27.25 3.49 466.09 4.86 6.97 126.25 430.91 
2002 139.58 277.42 27.75 3.75 471.8 5.67 6.54 124.56 445.39 
2003 147.57 279.8 28.61 4.08 477.41 5.86 5.83 122.87 459.88 
2004 160.62 285.82 29.93 4.47 484.07 5.52 5.84 120.92 474.37 
2005 182.83 300.62 31.58 4.64 506.13 5.24 5.87 120.06 482.08 
2006 191.3 302.52 33.23 3.85 504.8 4.79 6.41 120.17 489.55 
2007 190.64 305.65 34.73 2.85 505.87 4.71 6.34 116.14 497.38 
2008 179.04 305.26 36.24 1.78 512.18 5.84 6.03 114.81 511.3 
2009 171.26 289.27 34.93 1.19 506.18 9.2 5.04 115.27 515.39 
2010 168.23 287.54 35.76 1.21 511.12 9.6 4.69 114.66 529.44 
2011 163.27 292.84 37.61 1.22 516.76 8.95 4.45 113.84 543.66 
2012 164.4 297.52 38.96 1.67 521.75 8.07 3.66 111.78 558.32 
2013 170.12 287.26 39.09 1.91 499.71 7.42 3.98 109.89 546.56 
2014 177.19 293.47 40.66 2.02 504.82 6.27 4.17 109.05 561.34 
2015 185.78 300.23 41.99 2.17 510.13 5.49 3.85 107.48 576.57 
 
Panel D:overall, between and within statistics of score and hp  
Variable   Mean Std Dev. Min Max Obs 








9.46 9.81 156.58 T-bar=18.96 








34.66 28.29 335.12 T-bar=18.96 
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Table 3: Fundamental regressions (Step 1) 
This table provides results of fundamental regressions. The dependent variable is housing price index (hp) and 
the independent variables are six fundamentals discussed in the data section. income is income per capita in 
thousands of dollars; population is thousands of persons; permits is thousands of housing permits; 
unemployment rate and mortgage rate are in %; employment is thousands of jobs and constant is the intercept 
term. Model 1 is the whole sample results; Model 2 includes only the big MSAs which is defined as MSAs with 
population over the median of the whole sample; Model 3 uses the data from 2000 to 2010; Model 4 uses the 
data during the recent business cycle from 2000 to 2015. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value 
as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001. 
 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
hp All data Big MSAs 2000-2010 Business cycle 
     
income 2.869*** 3.460*** 3.023*** 2.502*** 
 (0.064) (0.100) (0.113) (0.076) 
     
population 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.074*** 0.050*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
     
permits 1.514*** 1.381*** 1.380*** 1.427*** 
 (0.100) (0.110) (0.142) (0.121) 
     
mortgage_rate -4.870*** -2.036*** -6.617*** 1.160** 
 (0.348) (0.544) (0.912) (0.493) 
     
unemployment_rate -0.703*** -0.784*** -1.623*** -0.808*** 
 (0.131) (0.221) (0.279) (0.187) 
     
employment -0.102*** -0.114*** -0.140*** -0.099*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) 
     
Constant 95.713*** 57.371*** 119.096*** 80.153*** 
 (4.191) (6.720) (8.853) (5.287) 
     
Observations 6,730 3,365 3,058 4,779 























Table 4. Baseline Regressions 
This table provides the details of baseline regressions. Panel A shows the results of OLS regressions and Panel 
B provides the results of 2SLS regressions using congregation as an instrumental variable for score. The 
dependent variable is HBP from Table 3 Model 1 and the test variable is score (or instrumented score in Panel 
B). Model 1 has no fixed effects; Model 2 includes year fixed effects; Model 3 includes MSA fixed effects; 
Model 4 has both year and MSA fixed effects. Model 5 includes Region fixed effects. Model 6 has both Region 
and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p 
< 0.001. 
 
Panel A       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
score -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.058*** -0.029* -0.027*** -0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
income 0.415*** 0.471*** -0.059 -0.132** 0.378*** 0.427*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.036) (0.053) (0.023) (0.025) 
       
population 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009** 0.003 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
permits 0.431*** 0.429*** 0.149*** 0.178*** 0.444*** 0.448*** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.047) (0.046) (0.035) (0.035) 
       
mortgage_rate 1.676*** 1.766*** -0.492*** -0.611** 1.440*** 1.559*** 
 (0.121) (0.161) (0.163) (0.246) (0.121) (0.160) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.223*** 0.240*** -0.681*** -1.150*** 0.119** 0.112** 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.064) (0.089) (0.046) (0.051) 
       
employment -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Constant -7.932*** -11.222*** 21.203*** 22.025*** -6.645*** -9.754*** 
 (1.693) (1.873) (3.308) (3.653) (1.738) (1.910) 
       
Observations 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 
R-squared 0.088 0.149 0.344 0.402 0.110 0.170 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 



















Table 4 continued 
 
Panel B       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
       
score -0.665*** -0.600*** -0.759*** -1.063*** -0.812*** -0.695*** 
 (0.095) (0.079) (0.139) (0.368) (0.212) (0.155) 
       
income -0.063 0.079 -0.469*** 0.144 -0.157 0.039 
 (0.080) (0.065) (0.090) (0.119) (0.150) (0.098) 
       
population 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
       
permits 0.657*** 0.598*** 0.393*** 0.424*** 0.594*** 0.529*** 
 (0.063) (0.055) (0.071) (0.105) (0.073) (0.058) 
       
mortgage_rate 2.495*** 2.310*** 0.597** 4.263** 2.781*** 2.533*** 
 (0.221) (0.247) (0.281) (1.760) (0.418) (0.341) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.446*** 0.546*** -1.003*** -2.044*** 0.411*** 0.508*** 
 (0.077) (0.083) (0.096) (0.337) (0.113) (0.123) 
       
employment -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.038*** -0.046*** -0.018*** -0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Constant 74.258*** 60.681*** 114.635*** 110.803*** 89.173*** 68.168*** 
 (12.699) (10.431) (18.714) (31.898) (25.992) (18.271) 
       
Observations 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 
MSA FE   Yes Yes   























Table 5. Regressions results based on big MSAs 
This table provides results based on a sample of big MSAs. Panel A shows the results of OLS regressions and 
Panel B provides the results of 2SLS regressions using congregation as an instrumental variable for score. The 
dependent variable is HBP from Table 3 Model 2 and the test variable is score (or instrumented score in Panel 
B). Model 1 has no fixed effects; Model 2 includes year fixed effects; Model 3 includes MSA fixed effects; 
Model 4 has both year and MSA fixed effects. Model 5 includes Region fixed effects. Model 6 has both Region 
and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p 
< 0.001. 
 
Panel A       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
score -0.030*** -0.029*** 0.030 0.039* -0.022** -0.020** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
income 0.411*** 0.431*** 0.308*** 0.287*** 0.353*** 0.355*** 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.056) (0.095) (0.036) (0.040) 
       
population 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010** 0.006 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
permits 0.387*** 0.391*** 0.138*** 0.154*** 0.417*** 0.432*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.049) (0.051) (0.038) (0.039) 
       
mortgage_rate 1.545*** 1.694*** 0.392 0.617 1.222*** 1.366*** 
 (0.183) (0.245) (0.246) (0.425) (0.185) (0.245) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.239*** 0.237*** -0.425*** -0.805*** 0.132* 0.081 
 (0.075) (0.086) (0.095) (0.136) (0.076) (0.088) 
       
employment -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.034*** -0.026*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Constant -8.674*** -10.727*** 16.935*** 15.519** -4.745* -5.844* 
 (2.654) (3.030) (5.010) (6.340) (2.757) (3.134) 
       
Observations 3,365 3,365 3,365 3,365 3,365 3,365 
R-squared 0.084 0.120 0.338 0.374 0.108 0.144 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 




















Table 5 continued 
 
Panel B       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
       
score -0.655*** -0.607*** -0.526** -0.601 -0.479*** -0.469*** 
 (0.118) (0.099) (0.218) (0.600) (0.109) (0.096) 
       
income -0.205 -0.140 -0.036 0.663* -0.101 -0.073 
 (0.126) (0.112) (0.147) (0.367) (0.117) (0.104) 
       
population 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.020 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
permits 0.601*** 0.547*** 0.319*** 0.292** 0.485*** 0.466*** 
 (0.068) (0.060) (0.088) (0.141) (0.051) (0.050) 
       
mortgage_rate 1.955*** 1.548*** 1.296*** 4.492 1.547*** 1.371*** 
 (0.283) (0.351) (0.441) (3.659) (0.249) (0.312) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.737*** 0.968*** -0.718*** -1.409** 0.408*** 0.561*** 
 (0.145) (0.175) (0.153) (0.585) (0.117) (0.151) 
       
employment -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.041*** -0.048** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Constant 80.032*** 72.629*** 84.315*** 48.932 58.854*** 56.227*** 
 (17.062) (14.829) (26.851) (32.044) (15.453) (13.692) 
       
Observations 3,365 3,365 3,365 3,365 3,365 3,365 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 
MSA FE   Yes Yes   























Table 6. Regressions results based on 2000-2010 period  
This table provides the results based on a sample of 2000-2010 period data. Panel A shows the results of OLS 
regressions and Panel B provides the results of 2SLS regressions using congregation as an instrumental variable 
for score. The dependent variable is HBP from Table 3 Model 3 and the test variable is score (or instrumented 
score in Panel B). Model 1 has no fixed effects; Model 2 includes year fixed effects; Model 3 includes MSA 
fixed effects; Model 4 has both year and MSA fixed effects. Model 5 includes Region fixed effects. Model 6 has 
both Region and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value as * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01 and *** p < 0.001. 
 
Panel A       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
score -0.006 -0.007 0.105*** 0.098*** 0.007 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.024) (0.026) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
income 0.528*** 0.660*** 0.143** 0.116 0.479*** 0.602*** 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.060) (0.117) (0.035) (0.039) 
       
population 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.011* 0.010 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
permits 0.346*** 0.279*** 0.056 0.049 0.360*** 0.299*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.065) (0.066) (0.043) (0.043) 
       
mortgage_rate 2.789*** 3.182*** -0.462 -0.900* 2.396*** 2.738*** 
 (0.273) (0.309) (0.314) (0.524) (0.273) (0.311) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.555*** 0.822*** -0.606*** -0.655*** 0.431*** 0.669*** 
 (0.083) (0.092) (0.117) (0.170) (0.085) (0.094) 
       
employment -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Constant -24.486*** -33.614*** -1.317 3.757 -18.535*** -26.659*** 
 (2.988) (3.373) (5.517) (7.760) (3.029) (3.439) 
       
Observations 3,058 3,058 3,058 3,058 3,058 3,058 
R-squared 0.113 0.138 0.489 0.492 0.138 0.158 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 


















Table 6 continued 
 
Panel B       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
       
score -0.719*** -0.650*** 0.013 0.116 -0.818*** -0.744*** 
 (0.150) (0.139) (0.658) (1.319) (0.247) (0.225) 
       
income -0.169 0.035 0.065 0.114 -0.266 -0.039 
 (0.156) (0.147) (0.562) (0.158) (0.231) (0.203) 
       
population 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.011* 0.010 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
permits 0.526*** 0.439*** 0.070 0.047 0.440*** 0.355*** 
 (0.078) (0.074) (0.118) (0.181) (0.079) (0.074) 
       
mortgage_rate 4.005*** 4.170*** -0.371 -0.951 4.035*** 4.254*** 
 (0.509) (0.519) (0.714) (3.801) (0.688) (0.689) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.709*** 0.947*** -0.640** -0.640 0.628*** 0.875*** 
 (0.139) (0.143) (0.263) (1.141) (0.161) (0.169) 
       
employment -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.044*** -0.040 -0.022*** -0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.029) (0.006) (0.006) 
       
Constant 73.448*** 55.462*** 12.252 1.762 86.366*** 67.022** 
 (20.961) (19.801) (97.232) (148.236) (31.827) (28.689) 
       
Observations 3,058 3,058 3,058 3,058 3,058 3,058 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 
MSA FE   Yes Yes   























Table 7. Regressions results based on the recent business cycle  
This table provides the results based on a sample of data from 2000 to 2015 (the recent business cycle). Panel A 
shows the results of OLS regressions and Panel B provides the results of 2SLS regressions using congregation 
as an instrumental variable for score. The dependent variable is HBP from Table 3 Model 4 and the test 
variables are score_d1, score_d2, score_d3 and score_d4. score_d1 is an interaction term formed between score 
and a dummy variable d1 which equals to 1 if the year is during 2000 to 2003 and equals to 0 if not. Similarly, 
score_d2, score_d3 and score_d4 are interaction terms for 2004-2006, 2007-2010 and 2011-2015 respectively. 
Model 1 has no fixed effects; Model 2 includes year fixed effects; Model 3 includes MSA fixed effects; Model 4 
has both Year and MSA fixed effects. Model 5 includes Region fixed effects. Model 6 has both Region and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate p-value as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001. 
 
Panel A       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
score_d1 -0.027*** -0.059*** 0.055*** 0.047* -0.020** -0.036* 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.008) (0.020) 
       
score_d2 -0.041*** 0.029 0.041** 0.108*** -0.034*** 0.043** 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.008) (0.018) 
       
score_d3 -0.058*** -0.020 0.041** 0.033 -0.049*** -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.020) (0.023) (0.008) (0.014) 
       
score_d4 -0.021*** -0.060*** 0.067*** 0.006 -0.014* -0.057*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.020) (0.021) (0.008) (0.011) 
       
income 0.434*** 0.438*** 0.165*** 0.122* 0.405*** 0.406*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.059) (0.066) (0.026) (0.026) 
       
population 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.005 -0.002 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
permits 0.285*** 0.283*** 0.003 0.056 0.315*** 0.316*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.058) (0.057) (0.039) (0.038) 
       
mortgage_rate 4.135*** 4.525*** 2.085*** 1.257* 3.924*** 3.787*** 
 (0.258) (0.693) (0.268) (0.699) (0.259) (0.693) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.584*** 0.642*** -0.477*** -1.103*** 0.508*** 0.549*** 
 (0.061) (0.067) (0.093) (0.132) (0.062) (0.069) 
       
employment -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.022** -0.022** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Constant -24.666*** -21.558*** -11.160*** 2.061 -22.117*** -16.350*** 
 (2.108) (3.719) (4.233) (5.241) (2.181) (3.782) 
       
Observations 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 
R-squared 0.143 0.165 0.438 0.465 0.155 0.178 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 









Table 7 continued 
 
Panel B       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
       
score_d1 -0.522*** -0.119 -0.208 -0.061 -0.476*** 0.014 
 (0.092) (0.258) (0.221) (0.373) (0.110) (0.255) 
       
score_d2 -0.553*** -0.835*** -0.224 -0.177 -0.509*** -0.673*** 
 (0.092) (0.252) (0.224) (0.613) (0.110) (0.246) 
       
score_d3 -0.572*** -0.611*** -0.221 -0.299 -0.532*** -0.555*** 
 (0.091) (0.186) (0.225) (0.545) (0.112) (0.190) 
       
score_d4 -0.528*** -0.480*** -0.166 0.201 -0.494*** -0.429*** 
 (0.090) (0.133) (0.220) (0.713) (0.111) (0.131) 
       
income 0.133* 0.137** -0.011 -0.005 0.155** 0.165** 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.141) (0.221) (0.075) (0.074) 
       
population 0.012*** 0.013*** -0.003 -0.002 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
permits 0.432*** 0.427*** 0.131 0.016 0.358*** 0.354*** 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.105) (0.200) (0.057) (0.060) 
       
mortgage_rate 5.232*** -5.507 3.780*** 8.836 4.669*** -8.158 
 (0.868) (8.450) (0.841) (8.344) (0.831) (7.461) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.772*** 0.716*** -0.301** -1.512*** 0.659*** 0.538*** 
 (0.099) (0.117) (0.125) (0.428) (0.099) (0.117) 
       
employment -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.037*** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Constant 36.875*** 73.654* 15.389 -39.011 33.585** 77.159** 
 (11.511) (40.365) (26.018) (99.529) (13.375) (34.380) 
       
Observations 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 
MSA FE   Yes Yes   
















Table 8. Regression results based on an alternative big MSAs sample  
This table provides the results based on an alternative sample of big MSAs. Big MSAs are identified for each 
year if the MSA has population over the median population in that year. Panel A shows the results of OLS 
regressions and Panel B provides the results of 2SLS regressions using congregation as an instrumental variable 
for score. The dependent variable is HBP from the fundamental regression of this sample. The test variable is 
score (or instrumented score in Panel B). Model 1 has no fixed effects; Model 2 includes year fixed effects; 
Model 3 includes MSA fixed effects; Model 4 has both year and MSA fixed effects. Model 5 includes Region 
fixed effects. Model 6 has both Region and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate p-
value as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001. 
 
Panel A       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
score -0.029*** -0.028*** 0.035* 0.043* -0.022** -0.019** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
income 0.392*** 0.406*** 0.319*** 0.324*** 0.332*** 0.328*** 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.057) (0.096) (0.036) (0.040) 
       
population 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.008* 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
permits 0.384*** 0.391*** 0.139*** 0.154*** 0.414*** 0.433*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.049) (0.051) (0.038) (0.039) 
       
mortgage_rate 1.476*** 1.556*** 0.415* 0.716* 1.142*** 1.221*** 
 (0.185) (0.248) (0.249) (0.430) (0.187) (0.249) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.232*** 0.230*** -0.454*** -0.851*** 0.122 0.073 
 (0.075) (0.086) (0.095) (0.136) (0.076) (0.089) 
       
employment -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Constant -7.704*** -9.247*** 16.127*** 13.419** -3.505 -4.151 
 (2.668) (3.024) (5.059) (6.406) (2.777) (3.134) 
       
Observations 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 
R-squared 0.080 0.118 0.339 0.377 0.105 0.143 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 

















Table 8 continued 
 
Panel B       
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HBP 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
       
score -0.674*** -0.620*** -0.503** -0.532 -0.491*** -0.477*** 
 (0.122) (0.101) (0.218) (0.575) (0.111) (0.096) 
       
income -0.244* -0.175 -0.023 0.652* -0.135 -0.107 
 (0.131) (0.114) (0.150) (0.343) (0.119) (0.104) 
       
population 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.020 0.006*** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
permits 0.602*** 0.546*** 0.315*** 0.275** 0.484*** 0.465*** 
 (0.069) (0.061) (0.088) (0.133) (0.051) (0.050) 
       
mortgage_rate 1.908*** 1.411*** 1.252*** 4.112 1.473*** 1.223*** 
 (0.291) (0.361) (0.428) (3.417) (0.254) (0.319) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.715*** 0.941*** -0.741*** -1.398** 0.378*** 0.526*** 
 (0.145) (0.173) (0.154) (0.565) (0.116) (0.148) 
       
employment -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.043*** -0.048** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Constant 83.971*** 75.966*** 81.908*** 44.313 62.066*** 59.229*** 
 (17.679) (15.082) (27.004) (31.554) (15.801) (13.795) 
       
Observations 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 
MSA FE   Yes Yes   























Table 9. Summary of score coefficients for four periods separately 
This table summarizes the score coefficients for four samples. Each sample includes data for the respective 
period during the recent business cycle. For all samples, the dependent variable is HBP obtained from the 
fundamental regression for the respective period and the test variable is score (or instrumented score in 2SLS 
regressions). Fundamentals’ coefficients are omitted in this table. Model 1 has no fixed effects; Model 2 
includes year fixed effects; Model 3 includes MSA fixed effects; Model 4 has both year and MSA fixed effects. 
Model 5 includes Region fixed effects. Model 6 has both Region and year fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Stars indicate p-value as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001. 
 
score coefficient Obs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
2000-2003 OLS 920 -0.041*** -0.042*** 0.109** 0.113** -0.015 -0.015 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.044) (0.044) (0.013 (0.013) 
2000-2003 2SLS 920 -0.975*** -0.963*** -0.262 -0.295 -1.876 -1.842 
  (0.354) (0.347) (0.628) (0.868) (1.432) (1.381) 
2004-2006 OLS 847 0.049** 0.049** 0.024 0.018 0.052** 0.052** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.039) (0.039) (0.021) (0.021) 
2004-2006 2SLS 847 -0.103 -0.103 -0.481 -1.013 -0.182 -0.183 
  (0.169) (0.169) (0.569) (1.244) (0.308) (0.309) 
2007-2010 OLS 1,291 -0.046*** -0.045*** 0.152*** 0.146*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.039) (0.039) (0.012) (0.012) 
2007-2010 2SLS 1,291 -0.438*** -0.435*** 0.949*** 1.034*** -0.373** -0.373** 
  (0.149) (0.148) (0.290) (0.330) (0.156) (0.156) 
2011-2015 OLS 1,721 -0.043*** -0.041*** 0.100*** 0.122*** -0.032*** -0.029*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.037) (0.039) (0.009) (0.009) 
2011-2015 2SLS 1,721 -0.404*** -0.407*** -0.053 0.259 -0.241*** -0.252*** 
  (0.109) (0.108) (0.252) (0.970) (0.089) (0.088) 
        
Year FE   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE      Yes Yes 




















A1. Summary of score coefficients of dummy regressions for four periods separately  
This table summarizes dummy regression results for four samples. Each sample includes data from the 
respective period during the recent business cycle. The dependent variable is HBP obtained from Table 3 Model 
4 and the test variables are score and interaction terms. score_d1 is an interaction term formed between score 
and a dummy variable d1 which equals to 1 if the year is during 2000 to 2003 and equals to 0 if not. Similarly, 
score_d2, score_d3 and score_d4 are interaction terms for 2004-2006, 2007-2010 and 2011-2015 respectively. 
Fundamentals’ coefficients are omitted in this table. Model 1 has no fixed effects; Model 2 includes year fixed 
effects; Model 3 includes MSA fixed effects; Model 4 has both year and MSA fixed effects. Model 5 includes 
Region fixed effects. Model 6 has both Region and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars 
indicate p-value as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
2000-2003 OLS d1 3.207 25.132*** -1.220 3.210 0.991 22.160** 
  (2.696) (9.100) (2.477) (7.792) (2.689) (9.049) 
 score -0.034*** -0.032*** 0.050*** 0.030 -0.028*** -0.026*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) 
 score_d1 0.003 -0.027 0.032 0.006 0.020 -0.011 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
2000-2003 2SLS d1 -43.265 -40.276 -3.682 -50.818 -50.316* -47.489 
  (33.212) (35.676) (26.614) (50.025) (29.083) (31.363) 
 score -0.591*** -0.585*** -0.565** -1.517* -0.501*** -0.491*** 
  (0.096) (0.092) (0.237) (0.915) (0.110) (0.105) 
 score_d1 0.385 0.491* 0.074 0.327 0.441* 0.532** 
  (0.267) (0.258) (0.216) (0.330) (0.233) (0.224) 
2004-2006 OLS d2 -9.277*** -13.473*** -11.219*** -14.251*** -10.305*** -14.312*** 
  (2.434) (2.442) (2.079) (2.082) (2.417) (2.427) 
 score -0.042*** -0.047*** 0.063*** 0.015 -0.035*** -0.040*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) 
 score_d2 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.085*** 0.077*** 0.082*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) 
2004-2006 2SLS d2 57.870* 48.638 37.754 29.271 45.652 37.429 
  (32.903) (31.666) (25.759) (24.892) (31.564) (30.416) 
 score -0.490*** -0.465*** -0.310 -0.485 -0.489*** -0.466*** 
  (0.105) (0.097) (0.234) (0.476) (0.129) (0.117) 
 score_d2 -0.488* -0.440* -0.331 -0.283 -0.387 -0.347 
  (0.274) (0.264) (0.215) (0.210) (0.263) (0.253) 
2007-2010 OLS d3 -6.196*** -7.482*** -2.593 0.985 -5.784*** -6.959*** 
  (1.887) (1.945) (1.642) (1.771) (1.876) (1.934) 
 score -0.041*** -0.041*** 0.054*** 0.031 -0.033*** -0.033*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) 
 score_d3 0.023 0.021 0.004 -0.003 0.021 0.019 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
2007-2010 2SLS d3 13.678 9.606 46.755*** 40.477** 18.201 14.209 
  (26.418) (25.014) (17.635) (17.569) (25.600) (24.091) 
 score -0.505*** -0.510*** -0.385 -0.674 -0.470*** -0.468*** 
  (0.112) (0.107) (0.275) (0.573) (0.134) (0.124) 
 score_d3 -0.156 -0.128 -0.430*** -0.297** -0.194 -0.164 
  (0.227) (0.219) (0.151) (0.143) (0.220) (0.210) 
2011-2015 OLS d4 11.818*** -15.871* 10.689*** 2.159 12.711*** -13.741 
  (1.663) (8.858) (1.511) (7.509) (1.653) (8.798) 
 score -0.007 -0.015 0.102*** 0.060*** 0.005 -0.003 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) 
 score_d4 -0.056*** -0.045*** -0.056*** -0.050*** -0.065*** -0.054*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
2011-2015 2SLS d4 -13.664 -34.986 -61.933** -71.749** -7.648 -27.011 
  (23.666) (27.211) (30.182) (36.049) (23.194) (26.249) 
 score -0.678*** -0.586*** 0.099 0.419 -0.644*** -0.537*** 
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  (0.148) (0.128) (0.186) (0.422) (0.186) (0.156) 
 score_d4 0.178 0.090 0.591** 0.505* 0.122 0.039 
  (0.213) (0.188) (0.269) (0.265) (0.209) (0.180) 
        
 obs 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 4,779 
 Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Region 
FE 
    Yes Yes 




A2. Baseline regressions results based on clustered standard deviation by year 
This table provides clustered standard deviation (by year) results of baseline regressions (Table 4). Panel A 
shows the results of OLS regressions and Panel B provides the results of 2SLS regressions using congregation 
as an instrumental variable for score. The dependent variable is HBP from Table 3 Model 1 and the test 
variables is score (or instrumented score in Panel B). Model 1 has no fixed effects; Model 2 includes year fixed 
effects; Model 3 includes MSA fixed effects; Model 4 has both year and MSA fixed effects. Model 5 includes 
Region fixed effects. Model 6 has both Region and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars 
indicate p-value as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001. 
 
Panel A       















HBP OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
score -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.058** -0.029 -0.027*** -0.025*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.026) (0.025) (0.007) (0.008) 
       
income 0.415*** 0.471*** -0.059 -0.132 0.378*** 0.427*** 
 (0.072) (0.067) (0.158) (0.092) (0.073) (0.072) 
       
population 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009 0.003 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
permits 0.431*** 0.429*** 0.149 0.178** 0.444*** 0.448*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.093) (0.066) (0.071) (0.072) 
       
mortgage_rate 1.676*** 1.766*** -0.492 -0.611* 1.440*** 1.559*** 
 (0.300) (0.268) (0.676) (0.332) (0.304) (0.270) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.223** 0.240 -0.681** -1.150** 0.119 0.112 
 (0.106) (0.144) (0.295) (0.430) (0.143) (0.178) 
       
employment -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.030** -0.018 -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Constant -7.932* -11.222*** 21.203** 22.025*** -6.645 -9.754** 
 (4.354) (3.613) (8.541) (5.053) (4.343) (3.995) 
       
Observations 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 
R-squared 0.088 0.149 0.344 0.402 0.110 0.170 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 








Panel B       















HBP 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
       
score -0.665*** -0.600*** -0.759*** -1.063*** -0.812*** -0.695*** 
 (0.127) (0.121) (0.175) (0.335) (0.282) (0.235) 
       
income -0.063 0.079 -0.469** 0.144 -0.157 0.039 
 (0.165) (0.160) (0.210) (0.187) (0.276) (0.221) 
       
population 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014** 0.021** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
permits 0.657*** 0.598*** 0.393*** 0.424*** 0.594*** 0.529*** 
 (0.106) (0.092) (0.105) (0.135) (0.109) (0.092) 
       
mortgage_rate 2.495*** 2.310*** 0.597 4.263** 2.781*** 2.533*** 
 (0.427) (0.254) (0.780) (1.842) (0.458) (0.241) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.446*** 0.546*** -1.003*** -2.044*** 0.411*** 0.508*** 
 (0.117) (0.152) (0.311) (0.470) (0.134) (0.149) 
       
employment -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.038*** -0.046*** -0.018*** -0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Constant 74.258*** 60.681*** 114.635*** 110.803*** 89.173** 68.168** 
 (20.370) (19.445) (26.653) (25.687) (39.539) (32.058) 
       
Observations 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 
MSA FE   Yes Yes   






















A3. Baseline regressions results based on clustered standard deviation by MSA 
This table provides clustered standard deviation (by MSA) results of baseline regressions (Table 4). Panel A 
shows the results of OLS regressions and Panel B provides the results of 2SLS regressions using congregation 
as an instrumental variable for score. The dependent variable is HBP from Table 3 Model 1 and the test variable 
is score (or instrumented score in Panel B). Model 1 has no fixed effects; Model 2 includes year fixed effects; 
Model 3 includes MSA fixed effects; Model 4 has both year and MSA fixed effects. Model 5 includes Region 
fixed effects. Model 6 has both Region and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate p-
value as * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001. 
 
Panel A       















HBP OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
       
score -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.058* -0.029 -0.027** -0.025** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.034) (0.034) (0.012) (0.013) 
       
income 0.415*** 0.471*** -0.059 -0.132 0.378*** 0.427*** 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.087) (0.172) (0.063) (0.073) 
       
population 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009 0.003 0.010** 0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
permits 0.431*** 0.429*** 0.149 0.178 0.444*** 0.448*** 
 (0.073) (0.079) (0.105) (0.112) (0.068) (0.072) 
       
mortgage_rate 1.676*** 1.766*** -0.492 -0.611 1.440*** 1.559*** 
 (0.243) (0.261) (0.337) (0.671) (0.296) (0.310) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.223** 0.240** -0.681*** -1.150*** 0.119 0.112 
 (0.087) (0.101) (0.138) (0.258) (0.097) (0.110) 
       
employment -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.030 -0.018 -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.022) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
Constant -7.932** -11.222*** 21.203*** 22.025** -6.645 -9.754** 
 (3.462) (3.789) (7.033) (10.308) (4.224) (4.614) 
       
Observations 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 
R-squared 0.088 0.149 0.344 0.402 0.110 0.170 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 


















Panel B       















HBP 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
       
score -0.665* -0.600* -0.759** -1.063 -0.812 -0.695 
 (0.383) (0.316) (0.323) (0.956) (1.037) (0.745) 
       
income -0.063 0.079 -0.469** 0.144 -0.157 0.039 
 (0.321) (0.269) (0.232) (0.330) (0.683) (0.431) 
       
population 0.013** 0.013** 0.014 0.021 0.011 0.012* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.024) (0.008) (0.007) 
       
permits 0.657*** 0.598*** 0.393*** 0.424 0.594** 0.529*** 
 (0.168) (0.127) (0.150) (0.259) (0.237) (0.135) 
       
mortgage_rate 2.495*** 2.310*** 0.597 4.263 2.781 2.533* 
 (0.920) (0.750) (0.626) (4.483) (2.178) (1.440) 
       
unemployment_rate 0.446 0.546 -1.003*** -2.044** 0.411 0.508 
 (0.319) (0.364) (0.249) (0.945) (0.598) (0.669) 
       
employment -0.023** -0.024** -0.038 -0.046 -0.018 -0.020* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.040) (0.013) (0.012) 
       
Constant 74.258 60.681 114.635*** 110.803 89.173 68.168 
 (49.812) (40.573) (44.326) (84.851) (123.086) (84.115) 
       
Observations 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 6,730 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE     Yes Yes 
MSA FE   Yes Yes   
R-squared   0.126    
 
 
